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A NEW SYSTEM OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION? LET’S TAKE A DEEP
BREATH
Jennifer Daskal*
Some have argued that the detention center at Guantanamo Bay 
cannot be closed until the U.S. passes new preventive detention laws that 
would allow it to detain those who cannot be tried but are considered too 
dangerous to release.  This article rejects these claims, concluding that the 
existing criminal justice system can adequately deal with those who the U.S. 
should be seeking to detain.  The article also warns of the costs of trying to 
set up an entirely new system of detention without charge.  The article cau-
tions that such a system will negate many of the reputational gains asso-
ciated with the closure of Guantanamo, will undoubtedly be subject to mul-
tiple court challenges and delay, and will put a continuous spotlight on 
those subject to this alternative detention system—allowing them to glorify 
themselves as martyrs, rather than forcing them to bear the opprobrium of a 
criminal conviction.     
INTRODUCTION
Just about everyone agrees that Guantanamo should be closed. Sec-
retary of Defense Robert Gates, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and 
even President Bush have all said that they would like to close the detention 
facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.1 Five former secretaries of state—
including Henry Kissinger, James Baker III, and Colin Powell—have urged 
the next U.S. president to move quickly toward this goal.2 And President-
elect Barack Obama has committed to do so.3
Some have suggested that the United States cannot close Guanta-
namo unless it passes so-called “administrative detention” laws that allow it 
 * Senior Counterterrorism Counsel at Human Rights Watch. 
1 Press Release, President George W. Bush, June 4, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2006/06/20060614.html [hereinafter White House Press Release]; Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice, Interview with The Financial Times, April 20, 2000, 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/apr/83369.htm; Defense Department Budget for FY 
2008: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Defense of the H. Comm. on Appropriations,  110th 
Cong., Mar. 29, 2007.   
2 Shut Jail, Ex-Diplomats Say: Powell, Kissinger, Albright, Baker and Christopher also 
rge the Next President to Open Talks with Iran, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2008, at A15.   
3 See Steven Lee Myers, Bush Decides to Keep Guantanamo Open, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 
2008, at A16.  
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to detain those who cannot be tried for any crime, yet are too dangerous to 
release.4 Proponents present this as a middle-of-the-road solution to the 
problem of Guantanamo. Under this approach, detainees would be provided 
more procedural rights than they currently receive in Guantanamo, and the 
United States would be able to protect itself by detaining these and other 
potentially dangerous men taken into custody in the future, even if there is 
not enough evidence to convict them of a crime. Or so the thinking goes. 
But over the past 230 years, the United States has endured two 
world wars, a lengthy cold war, waves of domestic terrorism, and a civil 
war that almost broke the nation apart, without passing legislation that 
would allow the state to detain people for extended periods based on a pre-
diction of future dangerousness. In fact, the few executive-branch experi-
ments with such programs—the quickly-reversed suspension of habeas cor-
pus during the Civil War, the Palmer Raids of 1919–1920, the internment of 
citizens with Japanese ancestry during World War II, and, most recently, the 
large-scale detention of hundreds of men at Guantanamo Bay—have in one 
way or another been resoundingly repudiated as mistaken experiments that 
are contrary to the United States’ commitment to due process and the rule of 
law.
Before the United States adopts an entirely new system of deten-
tion—that permits the government to hold citizens and non-citizens without 
a trial or even charging them with a crime—based on a prediction of future 
threat, several key questions need careful assessment. 
I. WHO SHOULD THE UNITED STATES BE DETAINING?
In 2001 and 2002, the United States answered this question broadly, 
without providing any clearly articulated criteria. In addition to the foot 
soldiers fighting to defend the Taliban’s Afghanistan, the United States 
brought to Guantanamo those who may have once attended an al-Qaeda 
training camp, had some affiliation with an al-Qaeda member, or merely 
appeared to dislike the United States.5 Hundreds were held for years without 
charge before ultimately being released, either because the United States 
determined they were too insignificant to detain or because they were inno-
4 See, e.g., Ken Anderson & Elisa Massimino, The Cost of Confusion: Resolving Ambigu-
ities in Detainee Treatment, Stanley Foundation, March 2007; John Farmer, Op-Ed, A Terror 
Threat in the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008, § 4, at 14; Jack Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, 
Op-Ed, The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19.   
5 This article does not address the legality or appropriateness of so-called battlefield 
detentions of those picked up in Afghanistan and Iraq and held in connection with the ongo-
ing hostilities there. Rather, it focuses on the proposals to create a preventive detention re-
gime in the United States designed for individuals picked up around the world and brought to 
a setting far removed from any active hostilities. 
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cent people caught up in the wrong place.6 Others are still being held in 
Guantanamo—even though the United States has concluded that they 
should be released—because they cannot be returned to their home coun-
tries for fear of ill-treatment and the United States cannot find a third party 
to accept them.7
As Guantanamo has proven, it is not good counterterrorism policy 
to bring every potential terrorism supporter into a long-term detention sys-
tem in the United States. Mistakes are inevitably made, and innocent people 
detained, fueling the very anti-American resentment that terrorist recruiters 
feed upon.8 Moreover, such a system is simply impractical. Assume, for 
example, that the United States continued down the road of trying to detain 
every possible al-Qaeda associate. The U.S. military could march through 
the streets of Riyadh or Islamabad, arrest and detain just about any danger-
ous looking male between the ages of twenty and thirty-five. After all, at 
least some portion of them might one day join anti-U.S. forces, or want to. 
But no prison is large enough to hold all of the angry young men in the 
world. A smart counterterrorism policy would instead focus on incapacitat-
ing tough to replace members of the al-Qaeda network—the leaders, finan-
ciers, and technological experts—and the operators who planned or carried 
out terrorist acts. 
The United States Army’s new Field Manual on Counterinsurgency 
Operations provides the rationale for this more pragmatic—and effective—
approach. It is simply not possible to kill and capture every enemy in a bat-
tle with a non-traditional enemy like al-Qaeda, nor is it necessarily a good 
idea. “Dynamic insurgencies can replace losses quickly,” explains the 
6 See Tim Golden, Administration Officials Split over Stalled Military Tribunals, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 2004, at A1 (statement of Lt. Col. Thomas S. Berg: “It became obvious to us 
as we reviewed the evidence that, in many cases, we had simply gotten the slowest guys on 
the battlefield. . . . We literally found guys who had been shot in the butt.”); Corine Hegland, 
Empty Evidence, NAT’L J., Feb. 4, 2006, at 28, 31 (statement of Michael Scheuer, head of the 
CIA’s bin Laden unit from 1999 to 2004) (“We absolutely got the wrong people.”); MARK
DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, REPORT ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: A PROFILE OF 517
DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA, 5, 11 (2006) (only 45% 
of the 517 Guantanamo detainees accused of engaging in a hostile act in government’s sum-
mary of the evidence against them). 
7 See, e.g., William Glaberson, Release of 17 Guantanamo Detainees Sputters as Officials 
Debate the Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2008, at A20 (describing the fate of 17 Chinese Uig-
hurs who cannot be repatriated due to fear of torture, but have not been accepted by any other 
country to date). 
8 See, e.g., SARAH E. MENDELSON, CLOSING GUANTANAMO: FROM BUMPER STICKER TO 
BLUEPRINT 5 (2008), available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080905_mendelson 
_guantanamo_web.pdf (relying on consultations with intelligence and military experts to 
conclude that “[s]ymbols of alienation such as Guantanamo have served as a recruitment tool 
for individuals and groups who seek to harm the United States, increasing—not decreasing—
danger.”).
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Counterinsurgency Field Manual.9 The only way to win, therefore, is to “cut 
off the sources of that recuperative power” by diminishing the enemy’s legi-
timacy and appeal while increasing one’s own.10 The manual cautions that 
the United States loses its legitimacy, and therefore its ability to win the 
fight against al-Qaeda, if it engages in illegitimate actions. “Unlawful deten-
tion, torture and punishment without trial” are all cited as illegitimate ac-
tions to be avoided.11
The lesson from the Counterinsurgency Field Manual is clear. 
Rounding up every young man who hates the United States is neither possi-
ble nor effective. Rather, it fuels animosity towards the United States and 
becomes a talking point and recruiting tool for future terrorists. While such 
a policy may take a few would-be terrorists out of circulation, it aids al-
Qaeda’s ability to recruit others. 
Even the Bush administration seems to have recognized the need 
for greater selectivity in its detention decisions. The mass flood of detainees 
sent to Guantanamo in 2002 has now slowed to a relative trickle. Just six 
detainees have been sent to Guantanamo since 2007.12 According to De-
partment of Defense press releases, one was involved in a 2002 attack in 
Kenya that killed thirteen people;13 two planned and facilitated the move-
ment of foreign fighters;14 a fourth planned and directed al-Qaeda opera-
tions;15 a fifth was described as “one of al-Qaeda's highest-ranking and ex-
perienced senior operatives;”16 and the sixth reportedly served as “one of 
bin Ladin’s most trusted facilitators and procurement specialists.” 17 The 
government has claimed that each of these detainees has planned, partici-
9 DEP’T OF THE ARMY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, ch. 1, at 23 (2006), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf [hereinafter Army Field Manual]. 
10 Id.
11 Id. at 24.  
12 See infra text accompanying notes 13–17. 
13 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Terror Suspect Transferred to Guantanamo (Mar. 26, 
2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10662. 
14 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Terror Suspect Transferred to Guantanamo (June 6, 
2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10976; Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Terror Suspect Transferred to Guantanamo (Sept. 12, 2007), 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11323. 
15 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Terror Suspect Transferred to Guantanamo (June 22, 
2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11041. 
16 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Defense Department Takes Custody of a High-Value 
Detainee (Apr. 27, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx? 
releaseid=10792.  
17 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Defense Department Takes Custody of a High-
Value Detainee (March 14, 2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release 
.aspx?releaseid=11758. 
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pated in, or materially supported terrorist activity.  Each could presumably 
be prosecuted for his actions.18
II. IS IT REALLY TRUE THAT THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM CAN’T
HANDLE THESE CASES?
Proponents of preventive detention generally start from the premise 
that the criminal justice system cannot successfully prosecute international 
terrorists. But the United States has successfully prosecuted and convicted 
dozens of persons for terrorist activity, both before and after September, 
2001. Richard Reid, the shoe-bomber arrested in Boston’s Logan airport 
after trying to blow up a transcontinental flight;19 Zacarias Moussaoui, con-
victed of conspiring in the 9/11 attacks;20 and Mohammed Saddiq Odeh, 
convicted for his role in the 1998 Embassy bombings in Tanzania and 
Kenya,21 are now all behind bars for the rest of their lives.  Others are less 
familiar but significant nonetheless: Masoud Khan, sentenced to life in pris-
on for training to support jihad abroad;22 Ahmed Ressam, sentenced to 22 
years for smuggling and transporting explosives;23 and Mohammed Manus 
Jabarah, sentenced to life for planning to blow up U.S. Embassies in Singa-
pore and the Philippines.24  The list continues.  These men were all con-
victed by an established and reputable federal court system and are all now 
incarcerated in maximum security prisons. . 
Some question the current system, arguing that this list is uncon-
vincing. They say that terrorism prosecutions are too resource-intensive and 
messy, cannot effectively protect national security evidence, and fail to ade-
quately prevent future terrorist acts as a result of their focus on punishment 
for past acts. Others warn that the adaptations needed to deal with these 
18 This statement does not in any way credit the accuracy of allegations against men who 
have never had the chance to contest the accusations against them in a fair and open proceed-
ing, but merely notes that according to the untested Department of Defense allegations, each 
has committed an act of terrorism that could be prosecuted in federal court. 
19 Thanassis Cambanis, Sentenced to Life, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 2003, at A1.  
20 Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui Given Live Term by Jury Over Link to 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, May 
4, 2006, at A1.  
21 Benjamin Weiser, The Terror Verdict: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2001, at A1. 
22 See Jerry Markon, U.S. Judge Reduces “Va Jihad” Sentences, WASH. POST, July 7, 
2005, at A3. 
23 Hal Bernton & Sara Jean Green, Ressam Judge Decries U.S. Tactics, SEATTLE TIMES,
July 27, 2005, at A1. See also John C. Coughenour, Op-Ed, How to Try a Terrorist, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2007, at A27. 
24 Press Release, United States Attorney Southern District of New York, Canadian al 
Qaeda Member Sentenced to Life in Prison, Jan. 18, 2008, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/p 
ressreleases/January08/jabarahsentencingpr.pdf 
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problems will infect and undermine the due process protections in ordinary 
criminal prosecutions that are the mainstay of the criminal justice system.25
This criticism is overblown. It is true that criminal prosecutions are 
resource-intensive, but so are systems of preventive detention, particularly if 
detainees are entitled to regular reviews of their detention, as most propos-
als assume. 
To protect against the dissemination of classified evidence in crimi-
nal prosecutions, Congress passed the Classified Information Procedures 
Act (CIPA).26 The CIPA gives the government wide latitude to provide the 
defendant and the jury substitute forms of evidence to protect against the 
disclosure of evidence and sources it wishes to protect.  It has been used in 
countless terrorism cases, allowing the government to introduce evidence 
obtained by foreign law-enforcement and intelligence sources without com-
promising the integrity of those sources.27 As Patrick Fitzgerald, who prose-
cuted the 1998 embassy bombings case, explained: “[w]hen you see how 
much classified information was involved in that case, and when you see 
that there weren’t any leaks, you get pretty darn confident that the federal 
courts are capable of handling these prosecutions.  I don’t think people real-
ize how well our system can work in protecting classified information.”28
Even the Bush administration’s Department of Justice has extolled the 
CIPA’s virtues, stating that “the Classified Information Procedures Act, 
combined with strategic charging decisions, enable us to appropriately han-
dle . . . intelligence in criminal cases while protecting both the classified 
information and defendants’ due process rights.”29
To be sure, the CIPA also ensures that the defendant is not con-
victed based on secret evidence, and is instead presented whatever is shown 
to the fact finder. Notably this minimal due process requirement has also 
made its way into the congressionally-authorized military commissions for 
Guantanamo Bay detainees, which protect the defendant’s right to be 
present when evidence is being presented to the jury.30 It is hard to see how 
25 See supra note 4.
26 Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. § 8 (2000). 
27 See RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN JR., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING 
TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 84–90 (2008) (white paper for Human Rights 
First), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf.  
28 SERRIN TURNER & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE SECRECY PROBLEM IN TERRORISM 
TRIALS 25 (Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, 2005) (citing a consultation 
with Patrick Fitzgerald (Nov. 29, 2004)); see also Kelly Anne Moore, Take Al-Qaeda to 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, at A19.   
29 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER 4 (2006), available at
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/include/terrorism.whitepaper.pdf. 
30 See Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 949d (making clear that the defendant has a 
right to be present at all parts of the trial, unless he acts in such a way to disrupt the trial or 
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a detention system that allows for long-term detention based on secret evi-
dence would ever survive congressional, constitutional, or public scrutiny. 31
It is also simply untrue that terrorism prosecutions are exclusively 
backward-looking, responding only to crimes that have already been com-
mitted. To the contrary, criminal prosecutions are often used to prevent fu-
ture crimes from being committed. The Department of Justice cites its use 
of “material support,” “receiving material training,” and fraud crimes, as 
“allowing us to intervene at the stages of terrorist planning, before a terrorist 
act occurs.”32 The crime of conspiracy also allows forward-leaning prosecu-
tions. A conspiracy is committed when two or more people plan to pursue 
an illegal act, and one acts in furtherance of that plan, even if no such illegal 
act was actually completed.33    
That is not to say that the criminal justice system is perfect. It is 
complicated to bring international terrorism cases to trial. Rules addressing 
unique aspects of international terrorism cases, such as the timing of Miran-
da warnings given to suspects detained overseas, or the process for dealing 
defendants who wish to proceed pro se (without legal representation) are 
still being worked out by the courts.34 Crafting acceptable forms of substi-
tute evidence to protect national security under the CIPA is often labor and 
time-intensive.35 In some cases, prosecutors may ultimately be forced to 
drop certain charges, either because the evidence is tainted and inadmissi-
ble, or because even a substitute summary of classified evidence risks dis-
closing critical national security information that must be protected.  
Even if we conclude that the criminal justice system is not fool-
proof, the discussion should not end there. It is essential to consider the oth-
er side of the equation: the difficulties of creating an alternative system of 
preventive detention, the likelihood that it will not solve many of the prob-
lems it aims to fix, and the additional unintended costs. The remainder of 
this article lays out some of the key questions about a system of preventa-
tive detention that must be considered. 
threaten the safety of those present and is given a prior warning, and providing a mechanism 
for the introduction of substitute forms of classified evidence). 
31 The Supreme Court has described the defendant’s right to be present at trial and privy to 
the evidence against him as among the “safeguards to which all persons in the hands of the 
enemy are entitled.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633–34 (2006) (citation omitted). It 
seems unlikely that the government could lawfully deny detainees this minimal safeguard 
simply by declaring them subject to a newly created system of preventive detention.  
32 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 3.   
33 See 18 U.S.C. § 371. 
34 For a discussion of these issues, see Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 28, at 89–90, 101–
105.    
35 See id. at 87.   
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III. WILL A SYSTEM OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION SOLVE THE UNITED
STATES’ REPUTATIONAL PROBLEMS, OR WILL IT MERELY BE SEEN AS 
IMPORTING GUANTANAMO TO THE UNITED STATES?
Virtually every Western ally of the United States has publicly called 
for Guantanamo’s closure; and the operation of this prison camp has earned 
the United States condemnation by U.N. bodies and the European Parlia-
ment.36   Even those generally supportive of the Guantanamo facility agree 
that the detention without charge of almost 800 men in America’s backyard 
has tarnished the reputation of the United States.37
Merely importing Guantanamo to the United States will not solve 
the problem. The critiques of Guantanamo are not primarily related to its 
physical location. The major problem with Guantanamo is that people are 
held without trial or charge, based on evidence that may have been obtained 
through coercion, in a way that offends traditional American and interna-
tional notions of justice.  To convince a skeptical world that it has fixed the 
Guantanamo problem, the United States will have to show that detainees are 
provided fair process, including a meaningful opportunity to challenge the 
evidence against them.  Put simply, a system of detention in which detai-
nees continue to be held based on secret evidence that they are not permitted 
to see and unable to rebut is not going to allow the United States to rebuild 
its moral authority. Nor will a system that continues to rely on statements 
coerced from detainees through mistreatment and abuse. 
Moreover, any system under which detainees are denied a full and 
fair opportunity to contest the facts supporting their detention will almost 
certainly lead to error. Innocent people will likely continue to be locked up, 
creating even greater reputational problems for the United States as the facts 
of their cases become known. 
Colin Powell, discussing the Guantanamo Bay detainees, makes the 
point well: 
I would simply move them to the United States and put them into our fed-
eral legal system. The concern was, “Well, then they’ll have access to 
lawyers, then they’ll have access to writs of habeas corpus.” So what? Let 
them. Isn’t that what our system’s all about? And, by the way, America, 
unfortunately, has two million people in jail all of whom had lawyers and 
36 See, e.g., U.N. Committee Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the 
Committee Against Torture, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006); U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights, Situation of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 15, 2006); European Parliament Resolution on Guantanamo, EUR.
PARL. DOC. P6_TA(2004)0050 (Oct. 28, 2004). 
37 See, e.g., White House Press Release, supra note 1(“No question, Guantanamo sends a 
signal to some of our friends— provides an excuse, for example, to say the United States is 
not upholding the values that they're trying to encourage other countries to adhere to.”). 
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access to writs of habeas corpus. And so we can handle bad people in our 
system.38
IV. IF SUFFICIENT DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS WERE INSTITUTED TO 
PREVENT THE SYSTEM FROM RESEMBLING GUANTANAMO, WOULD THE 
NEW SYSTEM END UP LOOKING A LOT LIKE THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM ALREADY IN PLACE?
Imagine a preventive detention system where detainees are pro-
vided lawyers, a fair chance to contest the evidence against them, and pro-
tected against the use of evidence obtained through abuse.  The system 
would start to resemble to the criminal justice system already in place. The 
main differences would be that: (1) detainees could be held on suspicion of 
future dangerousness, rather than the more stringent standard of probable 
cause that they have committed a crime; (2) they would be entitled to regu-
lar reviews of the basis of their detention; and (3) hearings would presump-
tively be closed to the public and press, so as to prevent the dissemination of 
national security information.  
Let’s consider each of these deviations in turn. Detaining people 
based on a prediction of future risk is a dangerous business. The possibility 
of error is high, as is the possibility for abuse. How do we know that the 
prediction is right? What would be the criteria for assessing future risk?  
How would one be able to defend against such a prediction?   
Proponents of such a system suggest that we can protect against er-
ror through regular reviews of the decision to detain.  But such reviews car-
ry their own costs. Not only are regular reviews resource-intensive, they 
allow for—and in fact encourage—a continual spotlight on the detentions, 
turning the detainees into possible martyrs and increasing the likelihood of 
public critique and condemnation. Ironically, a regular review process is 
also likely to result in errors in the opposite direction—with potentially 
dangerous people being released sooner than in a system that has the finality 
of the criminal justice system.   
Compare this to the existing criminal justice system. Inchoate 
crimes like conspiracy allow the government to incapacitate potentially 
dangerous people before they have completed an unlawful act, but with 
much less risk of error or abuse. In such cases, the government must present 
evidence that a plan actually existed, and that the defendant took some steps 
to further the plan. This is something that defendants can then defend 
against, thereby mitigating the risk of mistake. 
38 Meet the Press: Colin Powell on the War in Iraq, Decision 2008 and Much More (NBC 
television broadcast June 10, 2007) (transcript), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id 
/19092206 [hereinafter Meet the Press: Colin Powell).
570 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:561 
The criminal justice system also provides finality not possible in a 
system that allows for regular review of detention. True, convicted terrorists 
can appeal their sentence, and terrorism trials have at times been criticized 
for being biased or unfair.  But the appeal process is finite, and the critiques 
are relatively muted. For the most part, those convicted of terrorism by the 
federal court system are sent to maximum security prisons where they fade 
into relative obscurity, without the risk that a regularly constituted review 
board will order their release. 
As for the desire to hold hearings behind closed doors, federal 
judges already have that power, so long as they can demonstrate that any 
such closure is narrowly tailored to satisfy a sufficiently compelling need.39
But as the Supreme Court has recognized, closed hearings should be the 
exception rather than the norm.  Proceedings which are closed to the public 
are much more likely to be viewed with suspicion, undermining public con-
fidence in the system and robbing it of one of its most important virtues—
the chance for those affected by violent crime to witness the perpetrators 
held to account.40 Federal courts have, and will undoubtedly continue to, 
designed clever ways to protect national security without going so far as 
closing the entire proceedings to the public, by, for example, allowing wit-
nesses to testify using masks and pseudonyms, monitoring counsel’s ques-
tioning to preempt against the inadvertent disclosure of classified evidence, 
and allowing the presentation of substitute forms of classified evidence un-
der CIPA.41
V. CAN THE UNITED STATES CREATE AN ALTERNATIVE FORM OF 
PREVENTIVE DETENTION WITHOUT IT BEING SUBJECTED TO YEARS OF 
COURT CHALLENGES AND DELAYS?
In answering this question, the efforts to set up a military commis-
sion system at Guantanamo should serve as a warning sign. Established in 
November 2001 as a way to bring swift justice to the detainees, their track 
record has been abysmal.42 The first set of commissions was struck down by 
39 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984). 
40 Id. at 508–509. 
41 See United States v. Rosen, 520 F.Supp.2d 786, 795 (2007) (discussing a variety of 
mechanisms for protecting disclosure of classified evidence); COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL 
COURTS, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE INDEFINITE DETENTION OF 
“ENEMY COMBATANTS:” BALANCING DUE PROCESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE WAR ON TERROR 143 (2004), available at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/1C_WL06!.pdf 
(describing the various ways in which classified evidence was protected from disclosure in 
the Embassy Bombings case). 
42 Alberto Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27 
(“[military commissions] can dispense justice swiftly.”).  
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the Supreme Court in June 2006 as unlawful.43 Although Congress quickly 
authorized a new set of commissions, these too have been subject to exten-
sive public criticism, legal challenge, and delay. Even the former chief 
prosecutor has denounced the system as unfair.44   
Seven years since their creation, the commissions have achieved 
just two convictions. Australian David Hicks was convicted by plea agree-
ment in March 2007 and is now free in Australia. In the first and only mili-
tary commission trial, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Osama bin Laden’s former 
driver, was acquitted of conspiracy and convicted of providing material 
support to terrorism.  He was sentenced to five and a half years, with credit 
given for five years’ time served. The comparison with the established crim-
inal justice system is stark: in this same time period, the federal courts have 
tried more than 107 jihadist terrorist cases, resulting in 145 convictions.45
As Guantanamo has demonstrated, it is not easy to set up an entirely 
new system of justice, replete with new rules and new procedures, without 
any legal precedents on which to rely. Such a system will undoubtedly be 
subject to multiple court challenges, international scrutiny, and critique. The 
more such a system deviates from the criminal justice system—by detaining 
based on anything less than probable cause, relying on secret evidence that 
the detainee is never shown, or allowing tribunals to consider evidence ob-
tained through coercion—the more the system will likely be subject to legal 
challenge and public criticism. Even if the system ultimately survives those 
challenges, it will still bear their scars. 
VI. WILL A PREVENTIVE DETENTION SYSTEM EFFECTIVELY DELEGITIMIZE 
TERRORISTS IN THE WAY THAT A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM DOES?
Terrorists, having political motivations behind their acts, like public 
attention. They like to be treated as special. When Khalid Sheikh Mo-
hammed appeared before a “Combatant Status Review Tribunal” at Guanta-
namo Bay, he wore the status symbol of “combatant” proudly, comparing 
himself to George Washington saying that had Washington been captured 
by the British, he, too, would have been called an “enemy combatant.”46
Treating terrorists as criminals strips them of that status and allows 
them to fade into relative obscurity. Judge William Young, who presided 
over the case of Richard Reid, understood this well. At the sentencing hear-
ing, Judge Young rejected Reid’s self-proclaimed combatant status, sen-
tenced him to life in prison, and told him: “[y]ou're no warrior. I know war-
43 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
44 See, e.g., Morris Davis, AWOL Military Justice, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, at A15. 
45 Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 28, at 24–25. 
46 Transcript of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing, 
at 21–22, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/transcript_ISN10024.pdf.  
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riors. You are a terrorist. A species of criminal guilty of multiple attempted 
murders.”47
In bypassing the existing criminal justice system and instead plac-
ing terrorists in a newly created system of administrative detention, the 
United States fuels the idea that they deserve special treatment and risks 
elevating their status. This risk is compounded by the likelihood that such 
detainees will be entitled to regular reviews of their detention—keeping 
their names and cases in the press and making them poster children for ter-
rorist recruiters. By comparison, the criminal justice system provides clo-
sure, allowing convicted terrorists to largely disappear from the public’s 
eye. 
Those on the front lines of the fight against al-Qaeda understand 
this well.  To reiterate the lessons from the Army’s Counterinsurgency Ma-
nual: the key to victory against a non-traditional foe like al-Qaeda lies in 
cutting off the enemy’s “recuperative power” by diminishing its legitimacy 
while increasing one’s own. “To establish legitimacy,” the manual contin-
ues, “commanders [should] transition security activities from combat opera-
tions to law enforcement as quickly as feasible. When insurgents are seen as 
criminals, they lose public support.”48
This is also a lesson that is supported by history. Between 1971 and 
1975, the British army rounded up close to 2,000 individuals it believed to 
be associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and interned them in 
prison camps, where they were held without charge. Violence increased, not 
decreased, as anti-detention anger helped fuel the conflict. 
Years later, the home secretary, Reginald Maudling—who once 
sanctioned the internments—said the experience from 1971 to 1975 was “by 
almost universal consent an unmitigated disaster,” which has left an indeli-
ble mark on the history of Northern Ireland.49 In the words of former British 
Intelligence officer Frank Steele who served in Northern Ireland during this 
period: “[Internment] barely damaged the IRA’s command structure and led 
to a flood of recruits, money and weapons.”50  Even Edward Heath, the Brit-
ish Prime Minister in 1971 when internment was introduced, later called it a 
“mistake” which “gave the IRA a way to recruit from amongst people who 
had been interned, and . . . proved impossible to stop.”51
47 Transcript of Criminal Sentencing, United States v. Reid, 214 F.Supp.2d 84 (2002 D. 
Mass.) (No. 02-10013), available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/31/reid.transcript.
48 Army Field Manual, supra note 9, ch. 1, at 23–24. 
49 UK MPs Vote for Anti-Terror Bill, CNN, Nov. 20, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001 
/WORLD/europe/11/20/gen.britain.bill/index.html. 
50 PETER TAYLOR, BEHIND THE MASK: THE IRA AND SINN FEIN 155 (1997).
51 John Gray, A dangerous Step in a Dangerous Place: Locking up Suspected Terrorists in 
Ulster Caused Mayhem the Last Time it was Tried, GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.), Aug. 23, 1988. 
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The United States should not again repeat Britain’s mistakes in 
Northern Ireland. 
VII. WHAT ARE THE RISKS OF REPLICATION—AND MISUSE—OF SUCH A 
SYSTEM ELSEWHERE?
The United States has long criticized other nations’ use of preven-
tive detention to detain without charge or trial.52 But as Guantanamo has 
demonstrated, the United States’ capacity to pressure others to change 
course is significantly diminished when it is viewed as adopting the very 
practices it condemns. U.S. diplomats in several countries have complained 
of being unable to challenge round-ups and detentions without trial because 
of Guantanamo. When a Human Rights Watch researcher raised concern 
about U.S. silence over the use of detentions without charge in Malaysia, a 
senior State Department official replied, “[w]ith what we’re doing in Guan-
tanamo, we’re on thin ice to push on this.”53
To make matters worse, other countries affirmatively point to the 
United States’ wrongful practices as role models for their own. “[E]very 
morning I pick up a paper and some authoritarian figure, some person 
somewhere is using Guantanamo to hide their own misdeeds,” explained 
Colin Powell in his discussion of why Guantanamo needed to be closed.54
And, in fact, a long list of leaders—including Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin, Bashar al-Assad of Syria, and Iran’s 
52 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Malaysia—Detention of Opposition Activ-
ists (June 5, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/3273.htm (“The Unit-
ed States understands the Malaysian government has ordered that four opposition activists 
arrested under the Internal Security Act in April be transferred to a detention camp, where 
they could be held for up to two years [without charge]. . . . The United States is deeply 
concerned about the detentions, which seem intended to prevent the detainees, against whom 
there are no criminal charges, from exercising internationally recognized rights of free 
speech, political expression, and assembly. The detainees should either be released or 
charged in open court.”); DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES—2006 4 (2007) (observing that “[t]he [Malaysian] constitution stipulates that no 
person may be incarcerated unless in accordance with the law. However, the law allows 
investigative detention, designed to prevent a criminal suspect from fleeing or destroying 
evidence while police conduct an investigation. Several laws also permit preventive deten-
tion to incarcerate an individual suspected of criminal activity or to prevent a person from 
committing a future crime. Such laws severely restrict, and in some cases eliminate, access 
to timely legal representation and a fair public trial.” (emphasis added)).  
53 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF SECURITY: COUNTERTERRORISM AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS ABUSES UNDER MALAYSIA’S INTERNAL SECURITY ACT 1 (2004) (quoting a Senior 
U.S. State Department Official), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/malaysia0504.  
54 Meet the Press: Colin Powell, supra note 39. 
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Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—have all pointed to Guantanamo to deflect atten-
tion from human rights abuses in their own countries.55
Malaysia’s justification of its system of detention without charge or 
trial under its Internal Security Act (ISA) sounds eerily similar to the claims 
made by preventive detention supporters in the United States. “To bring 
these terrorists through normal court procedures would have entailed adduc-
ing proper evidence, which would have been difficult to obtain,” explained 
Malaysia’s former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in 2001, a sentiment 
that carried over to the successor government.56 “ISA is preventive. You 
could not, therefore, go to court [to charge the detainees with a crime],” 
explained cabinet minister Datuk Mohamed Nazri to Human Rights Watch 
in July 2005.57
Clever dictatorial leaders around the world will almost certainly cite 
the U.S. preventive detention regime as a model for their own abusive prac-
tices. And the United States will have little standing to object.
CONCLUSION
Identifying potential weaknesses and hurdles to the use of the crim-
inal justice system is easy. But setting up a new system of detention is hard. 
A system that discards basic due process protections is not a solution. In 
contrast, a system that maintains these basic protections ends up looking a 
lot like the criminal justice system, but without the public buy-in, without 
providing the finality of a criminal conviction, and without the centuries of 
rules, procedure, and precedent to draw on. 
Everyone need not agree with all of the answers provided here, but 
everyone should be asking the hard questions: will a system of preventive 
detention really solve the problem the United States is trying to address? Or 
will it merely create bigger problems that must then be solved?   
As Colin Powell explained in discussing why Guantanamo should 
be closed. “[W]e have shaken the belief that the world had in America’s 
justice system by keeping a place like Guantanamo open and creating things 
55 See Interview with Vladimir Putin, President of Russia (June 4, 2007), available at
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/06/04/2149_type82916_132716.shtml; Interview 
with Bashar Assad, President of Syria (Aug. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,druck-372131,00.html; Press Release, 
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Message of H.E. Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to the American People (Nov. 26, 2007), available 
at http://www.un.int/iran/pressaffairs/pressreleases/2006/articles/13.htm. 
56 SAHR MUHAMMED ALLY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DETAINED WITHOUT TRIAL: ABUSE OF 
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT DETAINEES IN MALAYSIA 3 (2005), available at http://www.hrw.org
/reports/2005/malaysia0905. 
57 Id.
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like the military commission. We don’t need it, and it’s causing us far dam-
age than any good we get for it.” 58
The creation of an entirely new system of detention without charge 
within the United States will similarly cause more harm than good. It’s time 
to stop experimenting.  Let’s use the system that we know works.   
58 Meet the Press: Colin Powell, supra note 39.  
